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The Fight for the High Ground: The U.S. Army and
Interrogation during Operation Iraqi Freedom, May 2003 –
April 2004. By Douglas A. Pryer, Fort Leavenworth: CGSC
Foundation Press, 2009.
Major Douglas Pryer's study of the U.S. Army's interrogation operations in
Operation IRAQI FREEDOM between May 2003 and April 2004 is the most
difficult professional book I have ever read. The difficulty lies not in Pryer's
style. The Fight for the High Ground is lucid and clear. Pryer's book details a
descent into an amoral abyss by leaders from theater commanders to
individual interrogators during OIF. Pryer shows that poor leadership fueled
by weak ethical reasoning led to abusive, ineffective interrogation resulting in
strategic damage to the United States. Pryer offers many illustrations of
specific units and specific leaders who made bad decisions regarding
interrogation operations. These leaders based their ethical reasoning on ends
justifying any means necessary and combined this with a total disregard for
the interrogation doctrine in place at the time. While Pryer illustrates many
of the ambiguities in the 1992 U.S. Army Field Manual 34-52, he reserves his
strongest criticism for leaders who authorized and encouraged practices that
had no basis in doctrine, policy, or law and for which no soldiers were trained.
Pryer first discusses abusive practices used at Guantanamo Bay and in
Afghanistan, where interrogators who graduated from the Survival Evasion
Resistance Escape (SERE) course began to implement SERE interrogation
techniques into their questioning sessions. These abusive practices migrated
to Iraq when interrogators from Afghanistan or Guantanamo deployed there.
He contrasts the unethical and abusive practices cited in the Church Report of
August 2004 against the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and the 4th and
101st Airborne Divisions with the practices and results obtained by the
interrogators of the 1st AD in Baghdad.
Despite command guidance from CJTF-7 to "take the gloves off" regarding
interrogation, the senior leadership of the 1st Armored Division (1AD),
beginning with its commanding general—Major General Martin Dempsey—
enforced strict adherence to current interrogation doctrine and Geneva
Convention protections for all detainees. So-called "enhanced interrogations"
were never condoned within 1AD. Subordinate leaders from brigade
commanders to interrogation team leaders followed and reinforced Major
General Dempsey's guidance. These leaders realized that such practices
degraded the moral standing of the United States, the credibility and moral
character of the interrogator who practiced them, and were fundamentally
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ineffective in obtaining reliable information. As a result, 1AD substantiated
only five incidents of interrogation abuse during OIF I. Meanwhile, 1AD
detainees provided a steady stream of valuable intelligence.
Pryer identifies a number of systemic improvements to HUMINT operations
based on 1AD successes, including the expansion of the
Counterintelligence/HUMINT/Interrogation (2X) staff section of the
command intelligence directorate and the emphasis on document (and later
media) exploitation. While other organizations recognized the necessity of
expanding these capabilities, Major Pryer limits his focus to the units
comprising the 1AD task force and contrasts their interrogation practices and
results against the units cited in the Church Report.
Pryer identifies several areas in which the Army quickly adapted both its
structure and its doctrine to the current operating environment. Some of the
recommendations have been overtaken by events. The Department of
Defense no longer employs contractor interrogators and both national and
service interrogation policy is under constant refinement. Pryer focuses on
shortfalls in ethical leadership and decision making regarding interrogation.
He recommends improved and continuous training in both areas. Pryer
identifies the crucial weakness in the ethical training paradigm as the current
Army Values themselves. They are insufficient to deal with the complex
ethical problems arising from war and better suited to "organizational
efficacy" rather than a complex counterinsurgency.
Current advanced interrogator training courses offered by the Fort Huachucabased HUMINT Training Joint Center of Excellence offer more expansive
training on moral reasoning and the intersection of morality, ethics, and
interrogation policy and doctrine. Leaders must still ensure the humane
treatment of detainees and scrupulous adherence to published standards of
interrogation practice at all echelons. This book will remind senior leaders
and likely inform junior leaders how far we have come in the last nine years.
Pryer's arguments are sound, and on controversial topics such as the degree
to which military police should cooperate with interrogators he presents
numerous contrasting opinions offered during the 2003-2004 period. Pryer's
assessment of improvements in practice and policy would be more complete if
he had considered subsequent Army interrogation policy beyond the current
Field Manual 2-22.3. Additionally, he could have also considered the main
DoD policy implanting the current interrogation field manual—DoD Directive
3115.09, Intelligence Interrogation, Detainee Debriefing, and Tactical
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Questioning, first published in 2005 and re-issued in 2008 and 2013. All
HUMINT soldiers need to be conversant with this policy as well as the Army
Field Manual on interrogation.
All HUMINT leaders from the collection team leader to the Military
Intelligence brigade commander need to read The Fight For The High
Ground. Furthermore, maneuver battalion and brigade leaders should read
the book so they do not repeat these mistakes. The situations from this book
should be incorporated as case studies for interrogation team leaders,
HUMINT staff officers (2X), and S2s. The effects of Major General Dempsey's
command guidance on detainee treatment should be studied by brigade and
division commanders. Finally, future CGSC students should replicate Major
Pryer's structure and study to cover additional units and phases of the Iraq
and Afghanistan campaigns.
For an earlier review of Major Pryer's work, consult Dr. Pete Mansoor's
review in the July-August 2010 edition of Military Review. COL Mansoor
served as the 1st BCT/1AD commander during the period MAJ Pryer studied.
Kevin S. Gould is a HUMINT Staff Officer for the Office of the Deputy Chief
of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, Department of the Army
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